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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MOISES J. SANCHEZ, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, UTAH STATE HIGHWAY 
PATROL, and HAROLD C. CLEMENTS, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
Case No. 950273-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE UTAH STATE HIGHWAY PATROL 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Second Judicial 
District Court dated November 17, 1994, granting summary judgment 
in favor of defendant-appellee Utah State Highway Patrol• Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994) grants this Court 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal as transferred from the Supreme 
Court of Utah. 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue for review is whether the district court 
correctly held that defendant Utah State Highway Patrol had no 
special relationship with plaintiff giving rise to an actionable 
duty. On appeal from a summary judgment# the reviewing court, 
without deference to the trial court's rulings, determines "only 
whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and 
whether the trial court correctly held that there were no 
1 
disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v. Stater 784 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1989). In a negligence action, "[t]he issue of 
whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law to be 
determined by the [reviewing] court." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue before the Court 
is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff, a bystander at the scene of a minor single-
vehicle traffic accident on a snow-packed freeway off-ramp, 
brought suit in November of 1993 alleging, inter alia, that the 
injuries he received when he was struck by a sliding car resulted 
from the negligent failure of defendant Utah State Highway Patrol 
("UHP") to adequately control the scene (R. 1-7). On October 28, 
1994, the district court rendered summary judgment in favor of 
UHP (R. 136-37). The court dismissed UHP from the case by order 
signed November 17 and entered November 25, 1994 (R. 145-47: 
Addendum A, attached). On December 6, 1994, plaintiff filed a 
premature notice of appeal (R, 150-51) from the November 17 order 
while action was still pending against the defendant driver of 
the sliding vehicle. This remaining claim was dismissed by 
stipulation of the relevant parties in an order dated January 26 
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and entered January 27, 1995 (R. 159). 
The Supreme Court of Utah poured the premature appeal over 
to this Court by order of February 3, 1995 (R. 160). On February 
15, 1995, the Court entered a sua sponte motion for summary 
disposition based on the ineffective notice of appeal (Addendum 
B, attached). On February 21, 1995, plaintiff filed a timely 
notice of appeal (R. 162-63), and one week later moved to 
voluntarily dismiss the earlier appeal (Addendum C, attached)• 
The motion was granted the same day (R. 165). 
On April 20, 1995, the supreme court poured over the second 
appeal to this Court (R. 170). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
On December 30, 1992, plaintiff and his son stopped and 
exited their trucks on the snow-packed 24th Street off-ramp of 
northbound interstate highway 1-15 in Ogden, Utah, to render 
assistance to another motorist whose van had slipped off the ramp 
into the snow (R. 1 at 1 2; 63-64 at \ 1; 94 at 1 4). UHP 
Trooper Richard Taylor, en route to another accident, saw the men 
on the ramp as he drove along the highway (R. 94 at 1 4). He 
stopped his patrol car on 1-15 above the exit and called to them, 
telling them to leave the area due to the danger posed by the 
snow (isLJ . They initially resisted the trooper's request (iiLJ . 
He then approached them on foot, advising them against attempting 
to pull the van from the snow due to their potential liability 
for any damage to it, and informing them that he would call a tow 
truck for the stranded motorist (idLl. At that time, they picked 
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up their equipment and began walking toward their trucks (id.). 
Before they reached the trucks, another vehicle came down the 
off-ramp, lost control on the snow, and struck plaintiff (id. at 
1 5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the "public duty/special duty" doctrine, a government 
agency is not liable to a member of the public for injury caused 
by negligence absent a breach of duty owed to him as an 
individual. The essence of a relationship creating a special 
duty is dependence, as where one party assumes responsibility for 
another's safety or deprives him of his normal opportunities for 
self-protection. An obligation owed to the public at large is 
insufficient to create a special relationship giving rise to a 
duty. 
The undisputed facts of this case show no special 
relationship between plaintiff and the highway patrol. Trooper 
Taylor, as a member of UHP, held a general duty to the public at 
large to enforce traffic laws and ensure pedestrian safety. In 
advising plaintiff to leave the snow-slicked off-ramp, Trooper 
Taylor acted within the scope of these general duties, neither 
inducing plaintiff's reliance on the trooper's protection nor 
depriving plaintiff of his normal opportunities to guard himself 
from danger. Because the facts do not support the existence of a 
special relationship, the district court correctly granted 
summary judgment in favor of UHP, and plaintiff has articulated 
4 
neither facts nor policy considerations which would justify a 
reversal• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTIONS OF TROOPER TAYLOR DID NOT CREATE A SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF GIVING RISE TO AN 
ACTIONABLE DUTY, 
"To establish negligence or gross negligence, a plaintiff 
must first establish a duty of care owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff." ferret, 784 p.2d at 151; ss& aJLsc Beach Vt 
University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986); Qwens V, 
Garfield, 784 p.2d ii87f 1189 (Utah 1989); Rollins v. Petersen, 
813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991). As both this Court and the 
supreme court have held, "without a showing of duty, a plaintiff 
cannot recover." Lamarr v. Utah State Dep!t of Transp.r 828 P.2d 
535, 537-38 (Utah App. 1992); accord, Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1159; 
Beash, 726 P.2d at 415. 
With respect to a governmental entity, the duty cannot be 
simply a public duty, but must be a duty owed to a particular 
individual as the result of some special relationship: 
For a governmental agency and its agents to be 
liable for negligently caused injury suffered by a 
member of the public, the plaintiff must show a breach 
of a duty owed him as an individual, not merely the 
breach of an obligation owed to the general public at 
large by the governmental official. 
Ferreef 784 P.2d at 151. Acknowledging the distinction, this 
Court has noted that "[u]nder the public duty doctrine, !a duty 
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to all is a duty to none.'" Cannon v. University of ntahr 866 
P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993), ££X£^ flgniefl, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 
1994) (citations omitted); £££ alS£ Qtt£Hfi, 784 P.2d at 1189, n.2 
("Under the doctrine, the government is only liable if it owes a 
special duty to the individual plaintiff beyond the general duty 
owed to the public"); Obray v. Malmbarg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 
160, 162 (Utah 1971) ("[FJailure by a public sheriff to 
investigate a crime claimed by an individual to have been 
committed, ordinarily is a matter of judgment and discretion, not 
actionable or compensable, and not pursuable by an individual 
since the public official's duty is to the public . . .") 
(footnote omitted). Consequently, unless UHP owed some duty to 
plaintiff beyond its duty to the general public, plaintiff cannot 
recover. 
It is clear that Utah subscribes to "the 'special relation1 
analysis described in sections 314 through 320 of the Restatement 
of Torts/1 Roll ins
 f 813 p. 2d at 1159. The Rollins court 
described the analysis as follows: 
Section 315 sets out the general tort principle that 
one has no duty to control the conduct of third 
persons. -The Restatement then lists two exceptions to 
this general rule. First, if "a special relation 
exists between the actor and the third person," then 
the actor has a duty to "control the third person1 s 
conduct." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). 
Second, if "a special relation exists between the 
actor" and the plaintiff, the plaintiff has "a right to 
[the actor's] protection," presumably against harm from 
third persons. IcL 
Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1159. 
Under the first exception to the general rule of 
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nonliability, " [o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he 
knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others 
if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965). In the present case, 
plaintiff has not alleged that Trooper Taylor had taken charge of 
the injuring vehiclefs driver prior to the accident, or knew or 
should have known that the driver would be likely to cause bodily 
harm to others if not controlled. This exception is inapplicable 
to plaintiff's circumstances. 
Under the second exception, "[o]ne who is required by law to 
take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under 
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal 
opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other 
[to protect against unreasonable risk of physical harm]." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) (1965). Plaintiff has 
not alleged that he was in Trooper Taylor's custody at any time, 
nor do the facts suggest that the trooper deprived plaintiff of 
his normal opportunities for protection. As with the first 
exception, plaintiff has articulated no facts that meet this 
exception to the general nonliability rule. 
In applying the special relationship analysis of Restatement 
sections 14 through 20, the supreme court has agreed that tt[t]he 
law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty to act only when 
certain special relationships exist between the parties. These 
relationships generally arise when one assumes responsibility for 
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anotherfs safety or deprives another of his or her normal 
opportunities for self-protection." fieach/ 726 P.2d at 415. An 
examination of Utah precedent regarding special relationships in 
the context of the public duty/special duty doctrine demonstrates 
that under the undisputed facts of this case, Trooper Taylorfs 
actions did not create a special relationship with plaintiff 
giving rise to an actionable duty. 
Plaintiff makes much of the supreme court's finding of a 
duty in DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.r 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983). 
DCE is inapposite to the facts here. An action between private 
parties, it involved no public entity and no question of public 
duty. Rather than relying on Restatement sections 14 through 20, 
which the supreme court has held generally applicable in the 
context of a public agency, it was analyzed under section 323, 
which applies to the negligent performance of one who undertakes 
to render services. The duty in DCR was predicated on the 
parties1 underlying contract for services: "Similarly, 
contractual relationships for the performance of services impose 
on each of the contracting parties a general duty of due care 
toward the other, apart from the specific obligations of the 
contract itself." DCE, 663 P.2d at 435. Plaintiff has not 
suggested any contractual relationship giving rise to a duty in 
this case, nor has he addressed the effect of the public 
duty/special duty doctrine on section 323. 
More helpful to the analysis of the facts in this case are 
precedents dealing with public entities and public safety. In 
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Cannon, the plaintiffs, on their way to a university basketball 
game, were injured when a car struck them as they crossed the 
road between the university parking lot and the building housing 
the event. Two police officers had been assigned by the 
university to provide traffic control at the marked crosswalk 
where the accident occurred, but at the time of the accident, the 
officers were sitting in their patrol car, and the flares they 
had placed at the crosswalk were burned out. Noting that "the 
police officers1 duty, to enforce the traffic laws and ensure the 
safety of pedestrian travel, was a general duty owed to the 
public at large, not to any distinct group" (Cannon, 866 P.2d at 
589), the Court declined to find a special relationship between 
the university and the plaintiffs that would entitle them to 
relief. 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Cannon on the basis that 
"[t]he officers in Cannon did not interact individually with the 
Cannons . . ." (Brief of Appellant at 11). However, he points to 
no authority for his implied proposition that interaction with an 
identifiable member of the public is, by itself, sufficient to 
convert a public duty to a special duty, and precedent belies 
this theory. In Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 
1984), sheriff's deputies were called to a disturbance at a 
billiard hall involving a drunken patron. Finding the drunken 
man in the parking lot, they requested that he walk his 
motorcycle from the location. He complied, but was killed within 
minutes while riding the vehicle and failing to negotiate a 
9 
curve. The personal representative of the estate sued, claiming 
that the death was due to the officers1 negligent failure to 
arrest the decedent. The supreme court declined to find an 
actionable duty under these facts, favorably citing the analysis 
applied by a California court: 
Stout v. City of Porterville, 148 Cal. App. 3d 
937, 196 Cal. Rptr. 301 (5 Dist. 1983), is apropos to 
the question of whether the complaint states a cause of 
action. It states: 
The only additional duty undertaken by 
accepting employment as a police officer is 
the duty owed to the public at large . . . . 
... Appellants did not allege that [the 
officer] assured Michael Stout he would take 
care of him or by his words or conduct 
induced him to rely on the officer's 
protection. Appellcints did not allege that 
the officer in any way induced him into a 
false sense of security. In sum, appellants 
failed to allege a common law legal duty owed 
to them by the City and/or [the officer]. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Christenson, 694 P.2d at 613. Although the officers in 
Christenson dealt directly and personally with an individual 
whose abilities they believed to be compromised by alcohol, and 
who therefore might be seen as dependent on their protection, 
this fact was insufficient to demonstrate the plaintiff's 
reliance on the officers, to show an actionable undertaking of 
services to the plaintiff, or to create a special relationship 
giving rise to a duty. 
Trooper Taylor's brief interaction with plaintiff, whose 
faculties were unimpaired, pales by comparison to the interaction 
in Christensonf affording no grounds for a special relationship. 
Asked in interrogatories to "state with particularity all that 
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the Trooper did and all that he said between the time you first 
saw him and the time of the collision with defendant Clements1 
car" (R. 101) (emphasis supplied), plaintiff responded: 
When UHP Trooper Taylor was on his way to another 
accident and he saw us trying to help the lady get her 
van out, he yelled from Interstate 15 to my son and me 
that if we could get our vehicles out to go on home 
because it was dangerous with all the snow on the road. 
We yelled back and told him we were just trying to 
help. He did not hear us so he came down to where we 
were and told us not to pull the van out ourselves 
because if there was any damage done by us to the van, 
we would be liable for it. He said he would call a tow 
truck because they were insured. At that time, my son, 
Morris, and I picked up our chains and headed back to 
our trucks. From then on, I do not remember what else 
happened. I did not know I'd been hit by the 
defendant's car. 
R. 101-02. Trooper Taylor's actions, as described by plaintiff, 
do not support plaintiff's contention that the trooper "took 
control of the scene" (Brief of Appellant at 11) in a way that 
induced plaintiff's reliance on the trooper's protection. At 
most, they show the trooper's performance of a general public 
duty to enforce traffic laws and assure pedestrian safety--the 
duty this Court explicitly found insufficient to support a 
special relationship in Cannon, 
Plaintiff argues that 
[h]ad Sanchez refused to comply with the trooper's 
order, or had the trooper simply continued past the 
scene, Sanchez would have been near the van he was 
assisting when the other vehicle came off the ramp and 
slid off the road, instead of walking away from 
oncoming traffic, unable to see and appreciate the 
danger. 
Brief of Appellant at 7-8. This contention ignores the fact that 
had he not resisted Trooper Taylor's initial request to leave the 
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scene, he would have been out of harm's way long before the 
arrival of the vehicle that injured him. More importantly, while 
plaintiff claims to have "relied upon the trooper's assumption of 
control" (Brief of Appellant at 11), he does not claim to have 
been in the trooper's custody. He points to no assurances by 
Trooper Taylor that the trooper would take care of him and no 
words or conduct that induced him to rely on the trooper's 
protection or gave him a false sense of security. To the 
contrary, as plaintiff admits, the trooper specifically apprised 
him of the danger to which the snowy conditions exposed him (R. 
101), an action which should have alerted plaintiff to the need 
for caution and attentiveness to his own safety. He does not 
show that Trooper Taylor assumed responsibility for his safety or 
deprived him of his normal opportunities to protect himself. He 
does not assert that Trooper Taylor's actions interfered with his 
ability to observe traffic and respond appropriately. In short, 
he provides no basis for differentiating himself from the general 
public to which Trooper Taylor owed a public duty. The actions 
taken by Trooper Taylor to fulfill that duty do not, under the 
precedents of Utah's appellate courts, demonstrate a special 
relationship with plaintiff supporting liability in this case. 
POINT II 
PUBLIC POLICY WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY FINDING A SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Whether a special relationship exists is an "essentially 
pragmatic" analysis (Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1160). In Beach, the 
12 
supreme court stated: 
Determining whether one party has an affirmative 
duty to protect another from the other's own acts or 
those of a third party requires a careful consideration 
of the consequences for the parties and society at 
large. If the duty is realistically incapable of 
performance, or if it is fundamentally at odds with the 
nature of the parties1 relationship, we should be loath 
to term the relationship "special" and to impose a 
resulting "duty," for it is meaningless to speak of 
"special relationships" and "duties" in the abstract. 
Beach/ 726 P.2d at 418. This Court has addressed the policy 
considerations underlying the special relationship analysis 
specifically as applied to government officials: 
[W]hen the government deals generally with the welfare 
of all, it does so without a duty to anyone, unless 
there is a "special relationship" between the 
government and the individual. Absent such a doctrine, 
the government would be discouraged from adequately 
providing any general protections or services for the 
public. 
Cannon. 866 P.2d at 589 (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff contends that public policy supports recognition 
of his special relationship with UHP under the facts of this 
case. He suggests that holding police officers to a duty of 
reasonable care in using their authority is not an unreasonable 
burden. In support of his argument, plaintiff relies on DCR and 
Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159 (Utah 1966). His 
reliance on these cases is misplaced. 
In Hower the supreme court faced the question whether an 
ambulance driver should be held negligent as a matter of law in a 
collision with Howe's vehicle. The court did not address the 
issue of whether a duty was, in fact, owed to the plaintiff; 
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assuming the duty, the court simply held that the trial court had 
adequately protected the plaintifffs interests by instructing the 
jury of the ambulance driver's obligation to use reasonable care 
under the circumstances. £s£ 421 P.2d at 161. The opinion did 
not mention or discuss the special relationship doctrine. 
D£R, as previously discussed (see Point I, supra)r involved 
a duty predicated on an underlying contractual relationship and 
is therefore distinguishable from the present case. Moreover, 
D£R did not involve government entities and the concomitant 
public service concerns apparent in the line of cases represented 
by Cannon, and therefore did not address the public duty/special 
duty doctrine. Its factual inconsistency with plaintiff's 
circumstances vitiates its precedential value here. 
As plaintiff acknowledges (see Brief of Appellant at 12-13), 
the supreme court held in Ferree that "[t]he public interest 
would not be served by imposing liability on corrections 
officials and the state for the uncertain success that attends 
parole and probation programs/" 784 P.2d at 151, even though the 
failure of those programs can lead to tragic results--in Eexr££, 
the bludgeoning and death of an innocent victim. Although 
plaintiff argues that the policy concerns attending Ferree do not 
apply to his circumstances, he has failed to recognize that other 
public interests may weigh as heavily in a pragmatic analysis. 
Analyzing the pragmatic concerns in Cannon, this Court 
concluded that 
to adopt the Cannons1 theory that they were part of a 
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distinct group of pedestrians on their way to a 
basketball game would impose too broad a duty on the 
University and its police officers. It would expose 
the University to liability to every person injured in 
any accident that occurs while on the way to any 
University event. In the face of such exposure, the 
likely result would be for the University to stop 
providing any sort of traffic enforcement. Thus, the 
public interest would not be served by imposing 
liability on the University and its police officers in 
this case. 
Cannon, 866 P.2d at 590# n.3. The pragmatic concerns in the 
present case are analogous. To adopt plaintifffs theory, that 
his transient interaction with a police officer created a special 
relationship, would impose too broad a duty on the state. It 
would expose the state to liability every time a person was 
injured in an accident after contact with police, regardless of 
the nature of that contact. The likely outcome would be for 
police to stop intervening where the actions of motorists and 
pedestrians, however well-intended, may pose a potential danger. 
This result would be detrimental to the public interest in 
traffic safety and accident prevention. Contrary to plaintiff's 
conclusion, the duty plaintiff seeks to impose--a duty explicitly 
rejected by this Court in Cannon--is not "already well-entrenched 
in Utah law" (Brief of Appellant at 13) , regardless of how much 
he may wish it to be. 
Plaintiff's public policy argument fails to fairly weigh the 
competing policy considerations relevant to the special 
relationship analysis or to take cognizance of controlling 
precedent in a factually analogous case. He has neither 
acknowledged the Court's prior balancing of policy interests in 
15 
Cannon nor offered a justification for ignoring it. His desire 
to escape the result of this precedent simply does not warrant 
the outcome he seeks. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintifffs argument for recognition of a special 
relationship with UHP giving rise to an actionable duty under the 
circumstances of this case is unsupported in policy and 
contradicted by precedent. By engaging in performance of his 
public duty of traffic enforcement, Trooper Taylor did nothing to 
induce plaintiff's reliance on his protection or to disable 
plaintiff from protecting himself. Plaintiff has articulated no 
facts which set him apart from the public at large or provide 
grounds for reversal of the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the highway patrol. 
For these reasons, defendant Utah State Highway Patrol 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
decision. 
REQUEST RS ORAL ARGUMENT AND/OR PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendant does not believe oral argument is necessary to the 
disposition of this casef but desires to participate if oral 
argument is ordered by the Court. However, defendant believes 
that the facts of this case provide helpful guidance in 
clarifying Cannon and properly applying the public duty/special 
duty analysis to traffic enforcement activities. Defendant 
16 
therefore respectfully requests publication of the Court's 
opinion• 
Dated t h i s f ^ H i \ day of August, 1995. 
NanCy^. Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
17 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this , day of August, 1995, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following: 
Erik M. Ward 
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Hamilton & Shaw 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
ADDENDUM A 
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BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Utah Department of Transportation 
and Utah State Highway Patrol 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (301) 575-1600 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 4 ^ 
•* % 4 
MOISES J. SANCHEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, UTAH 
STATE HIGHWAY PATROL and 
HAROLD C. CLEMENTS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 930900509 
Judge W. Brent West 
This matter came before the Court on defendant Utah State 
Highway Patrol's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court, having reviewed the memoranda submitted on behalf 
of plaintiff and defendant and having heard oral argument, now 
rules as follows: 
There is no disputed issue of material fact. The only dispute 
is over the legal significance of the facts. 
Based on the facts of this case, there is no special 
1 A*> 
relationship established between the Plaintiff and Trooper Taylor. 
As such, Trooper Taylor owed no duty of care towards the Plaintiff. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court enters the following 
Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Defendant Utah State Highway Patrol's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted and Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED t h i s ^ day of f^\fl*rvt?i/ , 1994 . 
BY THE COURT: 
iVhlUkMhS: 
W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
ERIK WARD 
Attorney f 
gjkty lOJl 
Attorney for Defendant Clements 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL, postage prepaid, this g> day 
of November, 1994, to the following: 
Erik Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorney for Defendant Clements 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE UT COURT OF APPEALS / ' I ^ A U ^ ^ ^ . ^ t f f i 6 ^ 
COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Moises J. Sanchez, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v* 
State of Utah, Department of 
Transportation; Utah State 
Highway Patrol; and Harold C. 
Clements, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
SUA SPONTE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 950090-CA 
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
A docketing statement has been filed with the Court of 
Appeals in the above-captioned case. This case is being 
considered for summary dismissal, pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 10(e), on the grounds that the notice of 
appeal was filed from a non-final order since it preceded entry 
of an order dismissing plaintiff's claims against defendant 
Clements. In lieu of a brief, each party shall file a 
memorandum, not to exceed ten pages, explaining why summary 
disposition should, or should not, be granted by the court. 
Failure to respond may result in the granting of this motion. 
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be 
filed with the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before 
February 28, 1995. 
DATED this /$ day of February, 1995. 
$U&& 0, %e~JL 
R u s s e l l W. Bench, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of February, 1995, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the 
United States mail to the parties listed below: 
Erik M. Ward 
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Hamilton & Shaw 
Attorneys at Law for Appellant 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Barbara E. Ochoa 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham 
State Attorney General 
33 0 South 3 00 East, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 15th day of February, 1995. 
By ~~ ~ V/stf/' 'S/// 
Deputy Clerk 
ADDENDUM C 
ERIK M. WARD (3380) 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, HAMILTON & SHAW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 801-621-3317 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
MOISES J. SANCHEZ, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, UTAH STATE 
HIGHWAY PATROL and HAROLD 
C. CLEMENTS, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
APPEAL and MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
Appellate Court No. 9405079 
Plaintiff/Appellant in the above-entitled action respectfully moves the court to 
dismiss this appeal on grounds that Notice of Appeal filed December 6, 1994 was 
untimely. An order dismissing defendant Harold C. Clements was entered by the trial 
court on January 26, 1995, and a timely Notice of Appeal has subsequently been filed 
with the court. 
DATED this 28th day of February, 1995. 
Vi Erik M. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I HEREBY CERT/FY that on this 28th day of February, 1995, I mailed, postage 
prepaid and first class mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION to: 
Barbara Ochoa 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
